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A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus
[III.3] WHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE 
EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT WE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRACTICE OURSELVES.
The material for the wise and good man is his own ruling faculty: and the body 
is the material for the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils persons); 
the land is the matter for the husbandman. The business of the wise and good 
man is to use appearances conformably to nature: and as it is the nature of 
every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain in 
suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature to be moved towards 
the desire for the good, and to aversion from the evil; and with respect to that 
which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the money-changer 
(banker) is not allowed to reject Cæsar's coin, nor the seller of herbs, but if 
you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, he must give up what is sold for 
the coin; so it is also in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, it 
immediately attracts to itself; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will 
never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more than persons will 
reject Cæsar's coin. On this principle depends every movement both of man 
and God.
Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a man should exercise 
himself. As soon as you go out in the morning, examine every man whom you 
see, every man whom you hear; answer as to a question, What have you seen? 
A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is this independent of the will, or 
dependent? Independent. Take it away. What have you seen? A man lamenting 
over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing independent of the 
will. Take it away. Has the proconsul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of a 
thing is a proconsul's office? Independent of the will or dependent on it? 
Independent. Take this away also; it does not stand examination; cast it away; 
it is nothing to you.
If we practiced this and exercised ourselves in it daily from morning to night, 
something indeed would be done. But now we are forthwith caught half asleep 
by every appearance, and it is only, if ever, that in the school we are roused a 
little. Then when we go out, if we see a man lamenting, we say, He is undone. 
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If we see a consul, we say, He is happy. If we see an exiled man, we say, He is 
miserable. If we see a poor man, we say, He is wretched; he has nothing to eat.
We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to this end we should 
direct all our efforts. For what is weeping and lamenting? Opinion. What is 
bad fortune? Opinion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is 
blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling? All these things 
are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions about things independent of the 
will, as if they were good and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things 
dependent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, 
whatever may be the state of things around him. Such as is a dish of water, 
such is the soul. Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are 
the appearances. When the water is moved, the ray also seems to be moved, 
yet it is not moved. And when then a man is seized with giddiness, it is not the 
arts and the virtues which are confounded, but the spirit (the nervous power) 
on which they are impressed; but if the spirit be restored to its settled state, 
those things also are restored.
[III.13] WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON A SOLITARY 
MAN IS.
Solitude is a certain condition of a helpless man. For because a man is alone, 
he is not for that reason also solitary; just as though a man is among numbers, 
he is not therefore not solitary. When then we have lost either a brother, or a 
son, or a friend on whom we were accustomed to repose, we say that we are 
left solitary, though we are often in Rome, though such a crowd meet us, 
though so many live in the same place, and sometimes we have a great 
number of slaves. For the man who is solitary, as it is conceived, is considered 
to be a helpless person and exposed to those who wish to harm him. For this 
reason when we travel, then especially do we say that we are lonely when we 
fall among robbers, for it is not the sight of a human creature which removes 
us from solitude, but the sight of one who is faithful and modest and helpful to 
us. For if being alone is enough to make solitude, you may say that even Zeus 
is solitary in the conflagration and bewails himself saying, Unhappy that I am 
who have neither Hera, nor Athena, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor 
descendant, nor kinsman. This is what some say that he does when he is alone 
at the conflagration. For they do not understand how a man passes his life 
when he is alone, because they set out from a certain natural principle, from 
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the natural desire of community and mutual love and from the pleasure of 
conversation among men. But none the less a man ought to be prepared in a 
manner for this also (being alone), to be able to be sufficient for himself and to 
be his own companion. For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is tranquil by 
himself, and thinks of his own administration and of its nature, and is 
employed in thoughts suitable to himself; so ought we also to be able to talk 
with ourselves, not to feel the want of others also, not to be unprovided with 
the means of passing our time; to observe the divine administration, and the 
relation of ourselves to everything else; to consider how we formerly were 
affected towards things that happened and how at present; what are still the 
things which give us pain; how these also can be cured and how removed; if 
any things require improvement, to improve them according to reason.
Well then, if some man should come upon me when I am alone and murder 
me? Fool, not murder You, but your poor body.
What kind of solitude then remains? what want? why do we make ourselves 
worse than children; and what do children do when they are left alone? They 
take up shells and ashes, and they build something, then pull it down, and 
build something else, and so they never want the means of passing the time. 
Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down and weep, because I have been left alone 
and solitary? Shall I then have no shells, no ashes? But children do what they 
do through want of thought (or deficiency in knowledge), and we through 
knowledge are unhappy.
Every great power (faculty) is dangerous to beginners. You must then bear 
such things as you are able, but conformably to nature: but not ... Practice 
sometimes a way of living like a person out of health that you may at some 
time live like a man in health.
[III.16] THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO FAMILIAR 
INTERCOURSE WITH MEN.
If a man has frequent intercourse with others either for talk, or drinking 
together, or generally for social purposes, he must either become like them, or 
change them to his own fashion. For if a man places a piece of quenched 
charcoal close to a piece that is burning, either the quenched charcoal will 
quench the other, or the burning charcoal will light that which is quenched. 
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Since then the danger is so great, we must cautiously enter into such 
intimacies with those of the common sort, and remember that it is impossible 
that a man can keep company with one who is covered with soot without 
being partaker of the soot himself. For what will you do if a man speaks about 
gladiators, about horses, about athletes, or what is worse about men? Such a 
person is bad, such a person is good; this was well done, this was done badly. 
Further, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an ill-natured disposition? Is any man 
among us prepared like a lute-player when he takes a lute, so that as soon as 
he has touched the strings, he discovers which are discordant, and tunes the 
instrument? Such a power as Socrates had who in all his social intercourse 
could lead his companions to his own purpose? How should you have this 
power? It is therefore a necessary consequence that you are carried about by 
the common kind of people.
Why then are they more powerful than you? Because they utter these useless 
words from their real opinions; but you utter your elegant words only from 
your lips; for this reason they are without strength and dead, and it is 
nauseous to listen to your exhortations and your miserable virtue, which is 
talked of everywhere (up and down). In this way the vulgar have the 
advantage over you; for every opinion ([Greek: dogma]) is strong and 
invincible. Until then the good ([Greek: chompsai]) sentiments ([Greek: 
hupolaepseis]) are fixed in you, and you shall have acquired a certain power 
for your security, I advise you to be careful in your association with common 
persons; if you are not, every day like wax in the sun there will be melted 
away whatever you inscribe on your minds in the school. Withdraw then 
yourselves far from the sun so long as you have these waxen sentiments. For 
this reason also philosophers advise men to leave their native country, 
because ancient habits distract them and do not allow a beginning to be made 
of a different habit; nor can we tolerate those who meet us and say: See such a 
one is now a philosopher, who was once so and so. Thus also physicians send 
those who have lingering diseases to a different country and a different air; 
and they do right. Do you also introduce other habits than those which you 
have; fix you opinions and exercise yourselves in them. But you do not so; you 
go hence to a spectacle, to a show of gladiators, to a place of exercise ([Greek: 
chuston]), to a circus; then you come back hither, and again from this place 
you go to those places, and still the same persons. And there is no pleasing 
(good) habit, nor attention, nor care about self and observation of this kind. 
How shall I use the appearances presented to me? according to nature, or 
contrary to nature? how do I answer to them? as I ought, or as I ought not? Do 
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I say to those things which are independent of the will, that they do not 
concern me? For if you are not yet in this state, fly from your former habits, 
fly from the common sort, if you intend ever to begin to be something.
[IV.1] ABOUT FREEDOM.
He is free who lives as he wishes to live; who is neither subject to compulsion 
nor to hindrance, nor to force; whose movements to action ([Greek: hormai]) 
are not impeded, whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not fall 
into that which he would avoid ([Greek: echchliseis aperiptotoi]). Who then 
chooses to live in error? No man. Who chooses to live deceived, liable to 
mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discontented, mean? No man. Not one then of 
the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in 
sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid 
something and falling into it? Not one. Do we then find any of the bad free 
from sorrow, free from fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, 
and does not obtain that which he wishes? Not one; nor then do we find any 
bad man free.
Further, then, answer me this question, also: does freedom seem to you to be 
something great and noble and valuable? How should it not seem so? Is it 
possible then when a man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to 
be mean? It is not possible. When then you see any man subject to another or 
flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confidently affirm that this man 
also is not free; and not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does 
it for a government (province) or a consulship; and call these men little slaves 
who for the sake of little matters do these things, and those who do so for the 
sake of great things call great slaves, as they deserve to be. This is admitted 
also. Do you think that freedom is a thing independent and self-governing? 
Certainly. Whomsoever then it is in the power of another to hinder and 
compel, declare that he is not free. And do not look, I entreat you, after his 
grandfathers and great-grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or 
sold, but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feeling, "Master," 
even if the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him a slave. And if you 
hear him say, "Wretch that I am, how much I suffer," call him a slave. If, 
finally, you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a slave, though 
he wears a praetexta. If, then, he is doing nothing of this kind do not yet say 
that he is free, but learn his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, 
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or may produce hindrance, or to bad fortune, and if you find him such, call 
him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia; say that his master is from 
home; he will return soon, and you will know what he suffers.
What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his 
own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial 
government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered. What 
then is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance and 
unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing. What then is it in playing 
the lute? The science of playing the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science 
of life. You have then heard in a general way; but examine the thing also in 
the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of the things which 
depend on others can be free from hindrance? No. Is it possible for him to be 
unimpeded? No. Therefore he cannot be free. Consider then, whether we have 
nothing which is in our own power only, or whether we have all things, or 
whether some things are in our own power, and others in the power of others. 
What do you mean? When you wish the body to be entire (sound) is it in your 
power or not? It is not in my power. When you wish it to be healthy? Neither 
is this in my power. When you wish it to be handsome? Nor is this. Life or 
death? Neither is this in my power. Your body then is another's, subject to 
every man who is stronger than yourself. It is. But your estate is it in your 
power to have it when you please, and as long as you please, and such as you 
please? No. And your slaves? No. And your clothes? No. And your house? No. 
And your horses? Not one of these things. And if you wish by all means your 
children to live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your 
power? This also is not in my power.
Whether then have you nothing which is in your own power, which depends 
on yourself only and cannot be taken from you, or have you anything of the 
kind? I know not. Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man able 
to make you assent to that which is false? No man. In the matter of assent 
then you are free from hindrance and obstruction. Granted. Well; and can a 
man force you to desire to move towards that to which you do not choose? He 
can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds he compels me to desire to 
move towards it. If then you despise death and bonds, do you still pay any 
regard to him? No. Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is it 
not yours? It is my act.
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When you have made this preparation, and have practised this discipline, to 
distinguish that which belongs to another from that which is your own, the 
things which are subject to hindrance from those which are not, to consider 
the things free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are not 
free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things 
which do concern yourself, and turned from the things which do not concern 
yourself; do you still fear any man? No one. For about what will you be afraid? 
About the things which are your own, in which consists the nature of good 
and evil? and who has power over these things? who can take them away? 
who can impede them? No man can, no more than he can impede God. But will 
you be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things which are 
not yours, about things which in no way concern you? and what else have you 
been studying from the beginning than to distinguish between your own and 
not your own, the things which are in your power and not in your power, the 
things subject to hindrance and not subject? and why have you come to the 
philosophers? was it that you may nevertheless be unfortunate and unhappy? 
You will then in this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without fear 
and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear comes from what you 
expect, but grief from that which is present. But what further will you desire? 
For of the things which are within the power of the will, as being good and 
present, you have a proper and regulated desire; but of the things which are 
not in the power of the will you do not desire any one, and so you do not allow 
any place to that which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty.
Then after receiving everything from another and even yourself, are you 
angry and do you blame the giver if he takes anything from you? Who are you, 
and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) introduce 
you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give you fellow-workers, 
and perceptions and reason? and as whom did he introduce you here? did he 
not introduce you as subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a 
little flesh, and to observe his administration, and to join with him in the 
spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long as you 
have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when he 
leads you out, go with adoration of him and thanks for what you have heard 
and seen? No; but I would still enjoy the feast. The initiated too would wish to 
be longer in the initiation; and perhaps also those at Olympia to see other 
athletes. But the solemnity is ended; go away like a grateful and modest man; 
make room for others; others also must be born, as you were, and, being born, 
they must have a place, and houses, and necessary things. And if the first do 
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not retire, what remains? Why are you insatiable? Why are you not content? 
why do you contract the world? Yes, but I would have my little children with 
me and my wife. What, are they yours? do they not belong to the giver, and to 
him who made you? then will you not give up what belongs to others? will you 
not give way to him who is superior? Why then did he introduce me into the 
world on these conditions? And if the conditions do not suit you, depart. He 
has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the 
festival, those who take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, 
admire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear no 
trouble, and the cowardly, he will not unwillingly see absent from the great 
assembly ([Greek: panaeguris]) for they did not when they were present 
behave as they ought to do at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but 
they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not 
seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they received for 
contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, of a generous mind, manly 
spirit, and what we are now inquiring about, freedom. For what purpose then 
have I received these things? To use them. How long? So long as he who has 
lent them chooses. What if they are necessary to me? Do not attach yourself to 
them and they will not be necessary; do not say to yourself that they are 
necessary, and then they are not necessary.
You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the gods, and pray to be 
free; but I am not yet able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, I 
value greatly the preservation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire. 
But I can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek an 
example. Diogenes was free. How was he free? Not because he was born of free 
parents, but because he was himself free, because he had cast off all the 
handles of slavery, and it was not possible for any man to approach him, nor 
had any man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had 
everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him. If you laid hold of 
his property, he would have rather let it go and be yours, than he would have 
followed you for it; if you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; 
if of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends, country, just the 
same. For he knew from whence he had them, and from whom, and on what 
conditions. His true parents indeed, the gods, and his real country he would 
never have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obedience to 
them and to their orders, nor would any man have died for his country more 
readily. For he was not used to inquire when he should be considered to have 
done anything on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the world), 
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but he remembered that everything which is done comes from thence and is 
done on behalf of that country and is commanded by him who administers it. 
Therefore see what Diogenes himself says and writes: "For this reason," he 
says, "Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the King of the Persians 
and with Archidamus the King of the Lacedaemonians, as you please." Was it 
because he was born of free parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the 
Lacedaemonians, because they were born of slaves, could not talk with them 
(these kings) as they wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why then 
does he say that it is in his power? Because I do not consider the poor body to 
be my own, because I want nothing, because law is everything to me, and 
nothing else is. These were the things which permitted him to be free.
Think of these things, these opinions, these words; look to these examples, if 
you would be free, if you desire the thing according to its worth. And what is 
the wonder if you buy so great a thing at the price of things so many and so 
great? For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang themselves, 
others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities 
have perished; and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and 
secure liberty give back to God when he demands them the things which he 
has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure 
torture, and exile, and scourging, and, in a word, to give up all which is not 
your own? If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten 
thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the palace (Cæsar's 
residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel that perhaps 
philosophers utter words which are contrary to common opinion (paradoxes), 
as Cleanthes also said, but not words contrary to reason. For you will know by 
experience that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the things 
which are valued and eagerly sought to those who have obtained them; and to 
those who have not yet obtained them there is an imagination ([Greek: 
phantasia]), that when these things are come, all that is good will come with 
them; then, when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the tossing 
to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things, which are not present; 
for freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are 
desired, but by removing the desire. And that you may know that this is true, 
as you have labored for those things, so transfer your labor to these: be 
vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion which will make you free; pay 
court to a philosopher instead of to a rich old man; be seen about a 
philosopher's doors; you will not disgrace yourself by being seen; you will not 
go away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher as you ought, 
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and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least; the trial (attempt) is not 
disgraceful.
[IV.2] ON FAMILIAR INTIMACY.
To this matter before all you must attend, that you be never so closely 
connected with any of your former intimates or friends as to come down to 
the same acts as he does. If you do not observe this rule, you will ruin yourself. 
But if the thought arises in your mind, "I shall seem disobliging to him and he 
will not have the same feeling towards me," remember that nothing is done 
without cost, nor is it possible for a man if he does not do the same things to 
be the same man that he was. Choose then which of the two you will have, to 
be equally loved by those by whom you were formerly loved, being the same 
with your former self; or, being superior, not to obtain from your friends the 
same that you did before.
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